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REPLY ARGUMENT 
POINT I - PLAINTIFF VIOLATED THE INSURANCE CODE. 
A. Mr. Mills1 Acts Related to the Law. Plaintiff in his 
Answering Brief claims difficulty in relating the facts of this 
case to a violation of the Insurance Code. Defendant is happy 
to clarify the violation by relating Mr. Mills1 acts to the 
law. 
1. The "performance bond" executed by Mr. Mills is a 
contract of insurance as defined by 31-1-7, because it is a 
"contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another or to 
pay an amount upon determinable risk contingencies," 
2. Signing and delivering the bond to Mr, Bradshaw 
was a "transaction of insurance" as defined by 31-1-11 because 
it was "execution of an insurance contract." 
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3. Mr* Mills caused his agency to become an insurer 
as defined in 31-1-10 because it became "engaged as surety." 
4. Mr. Mills" agency did not have a certificate of 
authority to transact insurance business. 
5. Mr. Mills caused his agency to violate the pro-
visions of 31-5-2 because "no insurer shall transact any 
insurance in this state except that authorized by a valid 
and existing certificate of authority issued to it by the 
Commissioner." 
6. Mr. Mills "knowingly participated in the violation 
of a provision of the Insurance Code" contrary to 31-17-50(b) 
by causing his agency to act as an insurer without a certi-
ficate of authority. 
1. Mr. Mills, "in the conduct of his affairs under 
his license," in causing his agency to act as an insurer 
without a certificate of authority, "showed himself to be 
and was deemed by the Commissioner to be untrustworthy" 
contrary to the provisions of 31-17-50 (h)• 
8. Mr. Mills in causing his agency to act as an insurer 
without a certificate of authority "exercised powers relative 
to insurance outside the scope of his licensing" contrary 
to the provisions of 31-17-50 (i). 
9. Mr. Mills in causing his agency to act as an 
insurer without a certificate of authority did not "act in 
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good faith, abstain from deception and practice honesty," 
nor did he "preserve inviolate the integrity of insurance" 
as required by 31-1-8. 
B. Mr. Mills' Agency was an "insurer." 
Plaintifffs answering argument in Point I is largely 
devoted to maintaining that Mr. Mills did not cause his agency 
to act as an insurer because although the performance bond 
was "insurance" and the execution of the bond was an "insurance 
transaction" the agency was not an "insurer" so as to require 
a certificate of authority. This so claims Plaintiff, because 
this transaction of insurance was an isolated one for which 
no premium was charged. 
A discussion of the definition of "insurer" will be 
helpful. We believe the definition as set out in 31-1-10 
reads as if phrased as follows: 
"Insurer" includes every person engaged as: 
1* Indemnitor, 
2. Surety, or 
3. Contractor in the business of entering into contracts 
of insurance or annuity. 
We believe the phrase "in the business of entering into 
contracts of insurance or annuity" modifies only contractor 
and not either surety or indemnitor. We believe this phrase 
was used primarily to eliminate from the definition of 
insurer "the insured" who is also a "contractor." Both 
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"indemnitor" and "surety" by definition include entering into 
contracts of insurance. If the phrase were construed to 
modify both indemnitor and surety as well, this section would 
be read as, 
"Insurer" includes every person engaged as indemnitor in 
the business of entering into contracts of insurance." 
which is not only redundant and circular, but not sensible. 
Although we believe the intent of the legislature as 
expressed in the wording is clear it should also be noted 
that the rules of legislative construction require such a 
result. Under the doctrine of the so-called "last antecedent," 
phrases are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately 
preceeding and are not to be construed as extending to others 
more remote. 2 CJS "Statutes" §334 and U.S. - Buscaglis v 
Bowie, C C A . Puerto Rico, 139 F.2d 294 - Corpus Juris cited 
in U.S. ex rel Santarelli v Hughes, C C A . N.J. 116, F2d, 
613,616? Utah - Corpus Juris cited in State v Navaro, 26 P.2d 
955, 959, 83 Utah 6 - Dunn v Bryan, 200 P.253, 77 Utah 604. 
It should also be noted there is no comma separating "con-
tractor" from "in the business of entering into contracts of 
insurance or annuity." This type punctuation as a general 
rule is construed to mean the clause modifies only the last 
antecedent and not all the preceding clauses. 82 CJS "Statutes" 
§334 and S.D. Lewis v Annie Creek Mining Co., 48 N.W. 2d 815. 
Finally, we think the results which would flow from 
Plaintiff's interpretation would be contrary to the whole idea 
of regulating insurance. Insurance, by its nature, provides Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for a small payment to be made to buy the protection. If 
the protected-against event occurs, usually a dis-
proportionately large sum must be paid the insured. Much 
of insurance regulation centers around making sure that this 
large sum can be paid as promised. For instance, the code 
requires that if an insurer obtains a certificate of autho-
rity to write suretyship insurance he must have $300,000 in 
capital and $500,000 in surplus - $800,000 over and above the 
liabilities of the insurer. In spite of this, Plaintiff 
contends that if an insurer is only at it part-time or spora-
dically so as not to be efficient and does not make money 
so as to be successful, he can write surety insurance without 
regulation by the Department. The legislature did not 
intend such a result. 
POINT II - THE VIOLATION WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO DEMAND 
LICENSE REVOCATION. 
A. The Circumstances of this Violation. 
Plaintiff in his brief would have the Court believe that 
the Plaintiff reluctantly and innocently succumbed to the 
pressures of Mr. Bradshaw and signed the bond with the idea 
that the bank would look at it and if they liked the surety 
they could accept it and if they thought the surety was not 
adequate, they could reject it. The Insurance Commissioner 
views the circumstances otherwise. Plaintiff's actions in 
signing a licensed insurer blank bond form and handing it to 
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Mr. Bradshaw together with a Mills-Gundry card to make the 
necessary changes and completions is a sorry story. It tells 
clearer than confession that Mr. Mills was aware he was doing 
a wrong. It also says something about Mr.. Mills. He was 
willing to implicate Mr. Bradshaw in a wrong instead of 
independently assuming the responsibility of an insurance 
transaction himself as a licensed insurance agent knowledge 
able in the field* These circumstances do not exculpate Mr. 
Mills but damn him. 
B. The Violation is ESerious. 
Let us look at the exposure of the bank. Assume the bank 
had accepted the performance bond as tendered them. Assume 
they then loaned the $1,000,000 for construction of the build-
ing with the building forming a substantial part of the secu-
rity for the loan. Assume the contractor did not build the 
building in accordance with the plans and specifications but 
shortcut the foundation by using less steel than required 
and less cement in the concrete than required so the building 
when completed was unacceptable and had to be razed. The 
bank would be out the $1,000,000 but would not have the 
contemplated building as security. These circumstances are 
remote of happening, but are the very kinds of circumstances 
against which the bank was trying to safeguard itself in 
requiring the performance bond. When Mr. Mills caused to be 
placed in the stream of commerce the bond which had all of 
the appearances of being executed by an insurer qualified 
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under the State Code to write such insurance and executed 
by an insurer regulated by the Insurance Department so as 
to minimize the risks of loss for an insured, Mr. Mills 
at that moment exposed the bank to these dangers. The bank 
was not damaged, but this was due to the bank's own 
carefulness, not to Mr. Mills1 probity. The integrity of 
the insurance industry requires that an insurance agent 
minimize this kind of risk, not contribute to this kind of 
exposure. 
For this reason, the Commissioner felt strongly enough 
to revoke Mr. Mills8 license. He feels strongly enough that 
Mr. Mills1 license should be revoked to perfect this appeal 
and urge this Court to overrule the Trial Courtfs judgment 
and allow him to regulate insurance within this state in 
accordance with the duty imposed upon him by the law. 
Dated this 6th day of December, 197 6. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ W ^ | / ^ 
William G^jGi^bs 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
350 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
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